



Stochastic Volatility vs. Jumps Role in Equity-Credit Modelling for Risk Management

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

- Volatility as Driver of Equity and Credit
 - Statistical evidence: levels and returns
 - Focus on volatility skew
- Historical Measures of Volatility Skew
 - Stochastic volatility: correlation between returns of equity and their variance
 - Jump-diffusion: jumps in equity returns
 - Co-existence of two phenomena
- Theoretical Explanations for Links between Volatility and Equity/Credit
 - Structural considerations (Merton)
 - Leverage effect
 - Jump-to-ruin
- Analysis of Effects
 - Levels and returns vs. jumps and leverage
 - Implied and historical measures
 - Cross-asset effects
- Suggestions and conclusions
- Working paper forthcoming on SSRN

What links equity volatility to equity and credit?

- We are interested in understanding the fundamental links between equity, credit and volatility [of equity returns]
 - See our 2014 conference presentations and recent papers on SSRN
- We start by focussing on an important element of volatility: the skew
- We have introduced a way to separate two mechanisms driving volatility skew in historical space: “Correlation” and “Jumps”
 - Inspired by two classical volatility models:
 - Stochastic volatility (Heston, 1993): variance-to-spot return correlation
 - Jump-diffusion (Merton, 1976): size and intensity of jumps
 - By analogy in historical space, introduce time-series estimates of
 - Correlation between equity returns and returns on their variance (“correlation”)
 - Average frequency times size of jumps in equity returns (“jumps”)
- We want to understand which mechanism works and how they interact
- Lipton, 2002*: a broad look at local and stochastic volatility, jump-diffusion and universal models for FX, for pricing and hedging/risk management
 - Conclusion: “*only models that take into account local, jump and stochastic features of the volatility dynamics and mix them in the right proportion are adequate*”
- We would like to test the “Lipton hypothesis” empirically

Equity volatility: the story in two graphs

- Top right: typical equity volatility skew shape (“smirk”)
 - Shown: RDN 6m implied volatilities from CBOE quotes Aug 2013
- We have a tool to understand what is going on in the low-strike region



- Bottom left: the equity-credit “hockey stick” curve
 - As shown, e.g., in Richard Martin’s presentation (QCE 2009)
- “Equity down, Spreads up” – but what is the role of volatility?

Volatility as a common driver for equity and credit

- See Chorniy & Greenberg, 2015 (<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2708143>) for a detailed literature review and all references used in this presentation
- Structural model: Merton (1974) asset return construction
 - Equity = Call, Debt = Put on asset value of the firm
- Volatility as a risk indicator can affect market prices of equity and debt
- Campbell & Taksler (2003): booming stock market in 1990s accompanied by rising corporate bond yields – counterintuitive?
 - Optimism of equity investors not shared by bond investors
 - Volatility may be the key: more upside for shareholders, more risk for bondholders
- Share prices and volatility of returns
 - “Leverage effect”: price growth is less volatile than price drops
 - Historical volatility commonly used as a predictor of future returns distribution
- Cremers et al. (2008) : implied volatility affects credit spreads
 - Both ATM and OTM/skew explain a significant part of CDS spread levels
- Carr & Wu (2009, 2011): economic similarity between CDS and deep OTM equity puts (“Jump to ruin”)

Risk factors and dependence: what to model and how

- Short-term co-movement: returns
 - Returns are best for describing/predicting underlying moves over short horizons
 - Correlated diffusions or common jumps to model joint behaviour
- Long-term predictions: levels
 - Trends matter much more for long horizons: diffusive moves average out (also $O(\sqrt{\Delta t}) \ll O(\Delta t)$), effect of jumps is short-lived
 - Classical example: long-term mean of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
 - Levels can be used to enforce “pathwise” dependence (e.g., in scenarios with low share prices, spreads should be high)
- Co-movements
 - Short-term: correlation of returns; long-term: dependence between levels
 - Common driver: functional/structural dependence behind two risk factors
 - Regime shifts, intertemporal dependence
- Market-implied vs. Historical measures
 - Historical data reflect “real-world” information (free of market risk premia)
 - Implied embed market’s views on probability of certain events (e.g., equity crash or issuer default)

Statistical relationships we can measure (I)

- Linear regression
 - R^2 indicates strength of relationship
 - Slope indicates direction of dependence (e.g., higher vol → wider spreads and lower equity returns)
- Various combinations to analyse
 - CDS and equity levels and returns...
 - ... regressed on implied and historical volatility and skew levels and returns
- Question 1: Historical volatility and skew measures
 - ATM “analogue”: standard deviation of equity returns, commonly used as “proxy”
 - Volatility skew – stochastic volatility (Heston, 1993) paradigm: historical correlation between equity returns and returns on their variance
 - Volatility skew – jump-diffusion (Merton, 1976) paradigm: historical estimate of average size times intensity of downward jumps in equity returns
- Answer: use both, compare effects and “domains of influence”

Statistical relationships we can measure (II)

■ Question 2: Measure of implied volatility skew

- Deep OTM volatility: potentially richer information about extreme moves (jump-to-ruin), but low liquidity + extrapolation introduces noise
- OTM – ATM (“smirk” only) or OTM – ITM (the “skew in the smile”)

➤ Answer: use both (results show little difference/benefit of extrapolated DOTM)

■ Question 3: Measuring levels

- CDS spreads: meaningful and universal indicator of default risk
- Equity prices: not comparable due to “size effect”, also geographical/FX dispersion
- Statistical point: time series must be stationary to be used in OLS regressions
- Defining “equity level” as share price normalised by relevant index quote substantially reduces undesired effects and improves comparability

➤ Answer: CDS spreads and “equity levels” (normalised prices) are used

■ Question 4: Relationship between implied and historical skew measures

- Distinction between “correlation” and “jump” effects is not as clean in implied skew
- Actual regressions on OTM-ITM vs. OTM-ATM do not “separate”

➤ Answer: regress implied volatility skew on historical “proxies” to see which effect dominates

Measurement: the boring details

■ Universe:

- Ca. 500 names from major international equity indices with liquid CDS
- Time series over 7 years: from September 2006 to August 2013
- Liquid subset: ca. 160 names with well-populated CDS, equity and implied vol marks since 2007
- Equity levels: ca. 200 names for normalised prices
- Source: BNP Paribas



■ Implied volatilities:



- 6m option implied ATM vols
- Deep OTM 6m put vols (30% and extrapolated to 10% strike)
- “Smirk” (deep OTM) as $(\text{DOTM} - \text{ATM}) / (10\% - 100\%) < 0$ for equity
- “Skew” (no “smile”) as $(\text{OTM} - \text{ITM}) / (30\% - 130\%) < 0$ for equity

■ Historical volatilities:

- Standard deviation of 10-day returns, estimated over 6 months and annualised
- Correlation of equity returns with variance returns measured over 6m window (“correlation”)
- Time-averaged jump measures over 6m windows (“jumps”)


Historical skew information: correlation, jumps or both? (I)

- Regress implied on historical volatilities, compare R²'s
 - ATM on historical vol levels dependence is high (65% median R² – not shown)
 - Regress OTM skew on the two historical “proxies”: “correlation” and “jumps”
 - Much weaker dependence overall, but jumps give a larger number of high values: median R² at 4.7% (mean at 8.3%), vs. 3.2% (6.6%) for the “correlation” proxy
- 3D plot of the *increase* in R² distribution when skew variable is added
 - Clustering is around the axes, rather than in the middle, which implies that one of the two effects usually dominates
 - Concentration higher at the “Jumps” axis, so jumps look more significant




Historical skew information: correlation, jumps or both? (II)

- Compare CDS and equity level regressions on two historical skew “proxies”
 - Similar 3D plots of the *increase* in R^2 's when skew variable is added
 - Compare how “correlation” (~stochastic volatility models) and “jumps” (~jump-diffusion models) historical proxies for volatility skew interact for the same names
- Clustering near the axes still present, for both CDS and equity, as above for skew, reinforcing the suggestion of “mutually exclusive” effects
- More clustering around the “jump” axis, consistent with assessment above
 - Equity level plot (right) in particular suggests that jump-diffusion language is better than stochastic volatility in historical measure



CDS levels



Equity levels

CDS and equity regressions on volatility: results

- Regression R² for CDS and equity on all volatility measures: all names...

Regression R ² Median		Implied volatility			Historical volatility		
		ATM vol only	ATM + skew DOTM-ATM	ATM + skew OTM-ITM	Hist vol only	Hist vol + Correlation	Hist vol + Jumps
Equity	Returns	30%	30.5%	31.5%	2.5%	2.5%	4.5%
	Levels	10%	24.5%	28%	9.5%	18%	19%
CDS	Returns	7.5%	8%	8.5%	2%	2%	2.5%
	Levels	31.5%	46.5%	52%	23%	32.5%	34%

- ... and liquid subset of names (except for equity levels)

Regression R ² Median		Implied volatility			Historical volatility		
		ATM vol only	ATM + skew DOTM-ATM	ATM + skew OTM-ITM	Hist vol only	Hist vol + Correlation	Hist vol + Jumps
Equity	Returns	39.5%	40%	42%	1.5%	2%	3%
	<i>Levels</i>	<i>10%</i>	<i>24.5%</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>9.5%</i>	<i>18%</i>	<i>19%</i>
CDS	Returns	19.5%	20.5%	20%	2%	2%	3%
	Levels	45.5%	54%	52.5%	40%	46.5%	52%

CDS and equity regressions on volatility: comments

- Relationship is stronger for implied than for historical volatility measures
- Volatility skew measures (of any flavour) are important for levels, but not for returns
- Dependence is stronger for levels than for returns, *except* for equity on implied volatilities, where dependence of returns is stronger
 - Recall time scale for dependence: returns = short-term, levels = long-term
- Liquid subset (second table) emphasizes the same dependence pattern
 - Significant improvement for CDS returns on implied vol returns
- Direction of dependence: **higher volatility → wider CDS, lower equity**
 - This is true for both levels and returns (verified by looking at regression slopes)
- Jumps as indicator of historical information for volatility skew play a part in explaining levels for both CDS and equity
 - This is consistent with 3D plots presented before
- No significant difference between two “flavours” of implied volatility skew
 - No visible “bias” of OTM-ITM towards returns or DOTM-ATM towards jumps

Volatility skew drivers: recap

- We introduced two historical proxy variables for volatility skew:
 - Correlation between equity returns and returns on their variance (à la stochastic vol)
 - Average size times intensity of jumps in equity returns (à la jump-diffusion)
- Both have explanatory power for implied volatility skew, as well as for CDS spreads (levels)
 - Results indicate a stronger influence of the jump variable
- We defined “equity levels” as index-normalised share prices
 - Removes “size effect” and improves stationarity of time series
 - Recovers similar dependence as for CDS spreads: skew adds explanatory power
 - Stronger influence of the jump variable compared to correlation variable, as for CDS
- For both equity and CDS spread levels, jump and correlation variables are not independent effects
 - Either one or the other is likely to drive volatility skew of any given name
- Thus judging by effects on the skew, the “Lipton hypothesis” can be challenged:
 - One out of stochastic volatility and jump-diffusion could be sufficient
 - Jump-diffusion is a favourable contender
- We look at wider mechanisms and predictions in more detail next

Beyond skew: stochastic volatility or jumps in our model?

Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. – A. Einstein

- A good [risk] model should reflect reality as much as possible
 - Material risk factors should be included
 - Dependencies which represent existing fundamental links will be more stable
 - Model type/approach can also be tailored to observed risk factor interactions
- Volatility models: stochastic volatility vs. jump-diffusion
 - Recall Lipton, 2002, for FX volatility models: mixture of all features required
 - We ask the question again in the context of equity-credit-volatility risk models
 - Simple regressions of skew indicate that the two features are orthogonal
 - Combine this information with theoretical predictions in a wider volatility model context, to refute or reinforce the preliminary finding
- Question: how do stochastic volatility and jump features interact in general?
 - Are jump and stochastic volatility effects significant for the same names?
 - Do the effects propagate across asset classes (equity, credit spreads) and dependency types (short-term, long-term)?
- Practical considerations: what model to invest in with limited resources?
 - Is a rich “hybrid” model a must?
 - Is any one feature sufficient and not too simplistic?

Volatility, Equity and Credit: theoretical models

- Three main interpretations of dependence between CDS spreads and equities, and volatilities
- “Pure” Merton, 1974: link via asset (i.e., firm value) volatility, which is a measure of investment risk
 - Equity = long call, Debt = short put on asset value
 - Equity volatility is a function of asset volatility, or is asset “vol of vol”
- “Leverage”: general term for equity volatility inversely related to equity returns
 - Financial leverage: debt-to-equity ratio of the firm, so drop in stock price increases leverage ratio
 - Share price drop \Rightarrow higher leverage \Rightarrow riskier stock \Rightarrow more volatile stock
 - Alternatively, volatility is a measure of [investment] risk
 - Higher risk requires higher return, so stock price needs to drop first (volatility increase should be persistent)
 - CDS also reflects the riskiness of investment (spread over “risk-free” investment)
- Equity volatility embeds a measure of probability of jump-to-default
 - Excess return of equity over risk-free rate compensates for possible default
 - CDS reflect market view of the default probability

Volatility, Equity and Credit: predictions

■ Merton and firm value volatility

- “Time value” of Merton options: changes convexity of equity-credit “hockey stick”
 - ⇒ Volatility increase means both equity and CDS spread increases
- “Vol of asset vol”: stochastic volatility model predictions
 - ⇒ Fatter tails make options more expensive, so both equity and CDS spreads increase (but less)
 - Equity investors like the risk (long vol), bond investors do not (short vol)
- So for Merton, **Vol up ⇒ CDS up, Equity up**
- Stronger *longer term impacts* expected if “time value” effect for the vol link; but always weaker than Equity-Credit predictions (below)

■ Leverage: more immediate dependence, expected to dominate in the short term

- Expect CDS, equity and volatility *returns* to be correlated
- “Hockey-stick”: when “Merton” reduces convexity the graph, “Leverage” moves to another curve
- So for leverage, **Vol up ⇒ CDS up, Equity down**

■ Link via default, or jump-to-ruin information:

- CDS, equity and volatility *levels* should be related
- **Vol up ⇒ CDS up, Equity down**

Volatility, Equity and Credit: results vs. predictions

- Empirically measured direction of dependence remains consistent for implied and historical volatilities, for levels as well as for returns
 - Larger volatility is associated with wider CDS spreads, and likewise for returns
 - Larger volatility is associated with lower equity prices and returns
- This is consistent with both “leverage” and “jump to ruin” interpretations

- Empirically, volatility skew is relevant for levels but not for returns
 - We expect ‘leverage’ to drive *short-term* behaviour (*returns*), while ‘jump to ruin’ information is embedded in values and is realised over *longer term* (*levels*)
 - Historical vols contribute to levels only, while implied vols contribute to returns
 - Also OTM skew (cf. deep OTM puts) is indicative of stock crash/default risk
 - Jump are dominant “driver” of skew
- This is consistent with dependencies between returns being driven by leverage, and dependencies between levels being driven by expected and realised jumps

- Merton explanation (“vol up → CDS, equity up”) does not work
 - “Vol up → Equity up” dependency could re-appear when time-dependent correlations or intertemporal dependence is considered

Returns vs. Levels and Leverage vs. Jumps

- Evidence of Jumps affecting levels (long-term)
 - Jumps are associated with CDS (jump to ruin probability) and OTM vol or skew
 - Observed jumps in the past fuel expectation of even more drastic jumps in the future
 - Strongest relationships by median R²: CDS on volatility *levels*
 - Relationship persists: both for implied and historical (i.e., over longer term) vols
 - Even normalised equity (*levels*) reach significant R² against OTM vol *levels*
 - OTM skew regresses somewhat better on the historical jump measure
- Evidence of Leverage affecting returns (short-term)
 - Leverage manifests itself in variance-to-equity return correlation (negative skew)
 - Strongest relationships by median R²: equity on implied vol *returns* (Leverage)
 - Returns R² unaffected by skew (~Jumps), so they must be driven by Leverage
- However separation is not clean, at best approximate:
 - CDS on implied volatility *returns* regression significant for liquid names
 - Historical measure of 'Leverage' skew (variance-to-equity return correlation) adds explanatory power to CDS level regressions as well
 - Equity "levels" (normalised prices) also regress well on 'correlation' historical skew proxy (and on OTM-ITM skew)
- Two "flavours" co-exist – but are they complementary or mutually exclusive?

Testing co-existence of Leverage and Jumps

- Assuming that one effect dominates levels and the other, returns
 - Mutually exclusive: low 'levels R^2 ' for names with high 'returns R^2 ' (and vice versa)
 - Mutually supporting: R^2 's for levels and returns tending to be low or high together
 - Co-existent, no relationship: "random" pattern across level and return R^2 's
- However we need to test the dominance hypothesis
 - If the same effect (Jumps) dominates levels, then all level R^2 's, across asset classes and volatility types, will tend to be high or low "together" (i.e., for the same names)
 - Similarly for returns, with an added twist: expect alignment of R^2 's *within* implied and historical volatility regressions, but not *across* (relationship not persistent)
- The above can be checked by looking at scatter plots of R^2 's and sign of the correlation between the corresponding vectors:
 - Mutually exclusive (negative correlation): scatter plot will have clusters along axes
 - Mutually supporting/same driver (high positive correlation): scatter plot arranges along a [straight] line
 - No relationship (low/near-zero correlation): uniformly distributed scatter plot
- This relates to the "Lipton hypothesis" of what is required of a model
 - Mutually exclusive means only one effect is at play – "universal model" not required
 - Mutually supporting or none mean both are important – "universal model" is needed


NB: look at regressions on ATM and historical vols only (to remove any skew bias)

Level and return regression drivers: mixed results

Correlations between R ² vectors			Levels				Returns			
			CDS		Equity		CDS		Equity	
			ATM	Hist	ATM	Hist	ATM	Hist	ATM	Hist
Levels	CDS	ATM	100.00%	57.82%	9.51%	3.19%	52.51%	14.06%	23.75%	4.64%
		Hist	57.82%	100.00%	9.16%	12.05%	25.67%	27.64%	16.56%	11.69%
	Equity	ATM	9.51%	9.16%	100.00%	68.66%	-1.90%	-3.93%	-1.19%	-10.19%
		Hist	3.19%	12.05%	68.66%	100.00%	-7.54%	5.70%	1.67%	-9.77%
Returns	CDS	ATM	52.51%	25.67%	-1.90%	-7.54%	100.00%	16.07%	46.29%	4.17%
		Hist	14.06%	27.64%	-3.93%	5.70%	16.07%	100.00%	5.41%	38.54%
	Equity	ATM	23.75%	16.56%	-1.19%	1.67%	46.29%	5.41%	100.00%	26.88%
		Hist	4.64%	11.69%	-10.19%	-9.77%	4.17%	38.54%	26.88%	100.00%



- Dominance hypothesis:
 - Levels dependence should be persistent (implied and historical vols) – TRUE
 - Levels dependence should propagate across asset classes – FALSE
 - Returns dependence aligned within volatility type: TRUE across asset classes
- Assuming ‘jumps’ explain levels and ‘leverage’ explains returns
 - CDS show “mutually supportive” pattern, Equity show “mutually exclusive” pattern
- Very few cases of interdependence, one “mutually exclusive” (weak)
- Therefore we do need both effects in the model: “Lipton hypothesis” stands!

Level and return regression patterns: examples




Alignment:

- CDS levels (left): implied vs. hist
- CDS vs. equity (right): on implied



- Mutually exclusive (left): equity returns vs. levels
- Mutually supporting (right): CDS returns vs. levels on implied vol



Conclusions and further research

- We introduced a way of measuring historically the significance of contributions from jumps and stochastic volatility effects to volatility skew
 - Correlations between equity returns and returns on their variance (~leverage)
 - Average downward jump size times intensity (~jumps)
 - Both play a role, jumps somewhat more influential for levels of equity, credit and implied volatility skew
 - Jumps and stochastic volatility tend to be mutually exclusive “drivers” of vol skew

- Analysis of fundamental relationships in a broader volatility context:
 - Stochastic volatility and leverage; jump-diffusion and jump-to-ruin expectations...
 - Levels as better links to jumps and returns, to leverage (as an approximation)...
 - Dependence between returns and levels, within and across asset classes...
- ... shows little interplay between the two effects, so need to be captured
 - Lipton’s conclusion for FX pricing models is supported
- Extending the analysis
 - Other asset classes (FX is a good candidate, specifically to understand skew)
 - Some evidence observed:
 - Regime shift: possibly different patterns for extreme returns
 - Longer-term intertemporal dependencies limit regression as a tool

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